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ABSTRACT
A great deal of experimentation and analysis has
been performed to quantify penetration thresholds of
components which will experience orbital debris
Impacts. Penetration had been found to depend upon
mission speclflc parameters such as orbltal altitude,
incIInatlon, and orlentatlon of the component: and upon
component speclfIc parameters such as material, density
and the geometry particular to its shleldlng. Experi-
mental results are highly dependent upon shield config-
uration and cannot be extrapolated with confidence to
alternate shleld configurations. Also, current experl-
mental capabilities are limited to velocities which
only approach the lower limit of predicted orbital
debris velocitles. Therefore, prediction of the pene-
trating particle size for a particular component having
a complex geometry remains highly uncertain.
This paper describes the approach developed to
assess on-orblt survivability of the solar dynamic
radiator due to mlcrometeorold and space debris
Impacts. Preliminary analyses are presented to quan-
tify the solar dynamic radiator survivability, and
include the type of partlcle and particle population
expected to defeat the radiator bumperlng (I.e., pene-
trate a fluid flow tube). Results of preliminary
hypervelocIty Impact testlng performed on radiator
panel samples (In the 6 to 7 km/sec velocity range) are
also presented. Plans for further analyses and testing
are discussed. These efforts are expected to lead to
a radiator design which will perform to requirements
over the expected llfetlme.
NOMENCLATURE
A area exposed to mlcrometeorold or debris
impact, mz
d diameter of spherical projectile, mm
h spaclng between plates (double plate model), mm
0.57 for aluminum alloy targets
0.38 for 17-4 PH annealed stainless steel
m particle mass, g
N flux of particles In particles/(year m2)
P probability of no penetration
T time of exposure to mIcrometeoroid or debris
Impact, years
t thickness of plate (single plate model), cm
tI thickness of first plate (double plate model), mm
t2 thickness of second plate (double plate model), mm
S spaclng between target plates (double plate
model), cm
V normal Impact velocity, km/sec
6p particle density, g/cm 3
&t target denslty, g/cm 3
6y yield stress of second plate (double plate
model), Ib/In. 2
INTRODUCTION
A program Is in progress to better understand the
envlronmental threat due to mIcrometeoroids and space
debris to a particular component In low earth orbit--
the solar dynamic power module radlator on Space Sta-
tion Freedom. The predIctlon of survlvablIity In low
earth orblt from mlcrometeorolds and space debris
Impacts Is challenging due to uncertalntles In (I) the
determination of the slze, mass and velocity of a par-
tlcle which will penetrate a particular component, and
(2) the predlctlon of the actual debris environment
that the component will encounter in terms of type of
particle (size and mass), population of particles In
orbit (currentlyandoverthe life of a component),and
Fluxof particles (byaltitude, velocity, direction,
andslze).
Theobjectiveof theprogramdescribedherelnisto reducethe first of theseuncertaintiesfor the
solar dynamicradiator. Thesecondof theseuncertain-
tles hasreceivedmuchattentionin thedesignof Free-
domandIs documentedin the literature (12).Thispaperdescribesthe approachusedto assess
survivability of the radiatordueto thls environmen-
tal threat, includingpreliminaryanalysesof surviva-
bility, resultsof preliminarypenetrationthreshold
testing, andplansfor future testing.
BACKGROUND
Solar dynamic (SD) power modules provide for the
growth power requirements of Freedom. The solar
dynamic radiator (SDR) acts as the thermal sink for
the Closed Brayton Cycle for the SD power system.
Figures I and 2 illustrate the SD radiator components
and baseline configuration. The multipanel radiator is
automatically deployed using a motorized, scissor-arm
and cable mechanism. Heat is rejected by pumping a
slngle-phase heat transfer fluld (n-heptane) through
the radiator panels, which are plumbed in parallel by
flexible hoses. Each radiator panel Is configured with
inlet and outlet flow manifolds. Flow tubes are con-
nected to manifolds by perpendicular take-offs and run
the length of the panel. The SDR contalns a redundant
flow path, which is to be used In the event of a fail-
ure of the prlmary flow path. The current deslgn calls
for !B actlve tubes per panel, alternatlng with 18
secondary (redundant) tubes. The SD power system and
radiator are described in detail in Refs. l to 3.
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FIGURE I. - CLOSED BRAYTON CYCLE SOLAR DYNAMIC POWER MODULE.
As can be seen In Fig. 1, the SD radlator is com-
posed of several parts which include the dep]oyment
structure, the deployment mechanism, the radiator
panels and the plumbing which connects the fluid flow
components to the radiator and connects the radiator
panels to each other. Impact of a large enougn parti-
cle could certainly damage the structure and must be
considered at some point In the program. However, the
current effort has concentrated on the deslgn and
analysis for protection of the fluid passages. A
puncture of one of the passages in a pumped liquid
radlator renders the entlre system Inoperative (thus
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FIGURE 2, - DETAILS OF SDR PANEL DESIGNS (ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES;
I INCH = 2,5/4 CM).
necessitating a redundant system). As a result this
aspect of protection is of primary concern.
The heat rejection system requlrements call for a
0.95 probability of no loss of heat rejection due to
penetration. The SDR is configured with multiple pan-
els In whlch Flow tubes (both primary and secondary)
are embedded In a parallel Flow path arrangement.
Full heat rejection capability (in the secondary Fluld
loop) is available should the primary Fluid loop be
penetrated: thus, the probability of no loss of heat
rejection due to penetration Is reduced to 0.77 For
each of the two redundant systems.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES
The flow tubes are shielded by a bumpered conflgu-
ratlon to reduce vulnerability to penetration by micro-
meteorolds and space debris In the Iow-earth-orblt
environment (Fig. 2). The fluid system also includes
panel manifolds (Figs. l and 2), Flex hoses (Fig. 3),
and conventlonal, l.O in. l.d. hard tube plumbing (in
the base structure and first elements of the deploy-
ment mechanism). Each of these components presents a
different target, and thus a different penetration con-
flguratlon, For Impact of a particle. Available ana-
lytical techniques from the llterature are all based
on empirical data from tests of two simple conflgura-
tlons: single sheet impacts and multlple, parallel
sheet Impacts. The SDR design incorporates shielding
geometries which, In some cases, pose complex projec-
tile paths for penetration of a particle Into the fluid
loop. For Instance, proJectlles traveling towards a
panel flow tube at an angle that Is not perpendicular
to the plane of the panel can encounter the panel face-
sheet, honeycomb and some portion of the bumpered
extrusion. To Justify appllcatlons of the available
analytical techniques to the more complex penetration
geometries Is not attempted; however, the equatlons
were used to obtain an initial evaluation For the pur-
pose of establishing the overall SDR vulnerability and
to Identify areas where design changes were required.
In this limited role the analysis was highly effective.
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FIGURE 3, - SDR FLEX HOSE DESIGN (ALL DIMENSIONS IN INCHES,
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The literature was surveyed and two technlques
were selected For use In analysis of the components
where the penetration path Is composed of more than one
surface (parallel sheets). These two techniques were:
d = [0.00288 V-I tll"g t_'6(Gt/&p) l 8 hG] (I/I0"5)• (I)
d = 20 V-I t2(_ _;p/6)-I/3 (Gpl_t)-I/6 (S &y/50 000) I/2
(2)
where SO 000 is yield stress of the 2024-T3 aluminum
target. Equation (I) is a modification of the equation
developed in Ref. 4 and Eq. (2) a modlFlcation of the
equation developed In Ref. 5. The equations were modi-
fled to include a ratio of particle to target density
for materials other than those tested. Equat!on (2)
was modified to include the handbook value for the
yield stress of 2024-T3 aluminum. Equation (2) consis-
tently predicts smaller diameter particles for penetra-
tion. Both equatlons are empirically derlved, so
differences in predictions are thought to be due to
differences in the experlments.
For components where a single sheet Is penetrated,
the equation glven below was employed (5):
t = K m0-352 V0"875 (3)
Once the dlameter or mass of the particle whlch
would Just penetrate the single sheet component IS cal-
culated, the Frequency of Impact of these slze partl-
cles (or larger particles) was taken from JSC 20 000
For debris and NASA SP 8013 for mlcrometeorold. It
should be noted that penetration of any portion of the
prlmary Flow loop ,would cause a fluid leak in that loop
and necessitate use of the redundant (secondary) flow
loop; thus, penetration of the Flow loop Is the design
criteria of interest. The probability of no penetra-
tlon Is calculated From:
P = e-NAT (4)
Analysis of the initial SDR configuration resulted
In probability of less than l percent survival. Analy-
sis of the components individually indicated the unpro-
tected hard lines and Flex hoses were the cause of the
low survival rate. The design was modified to add
bumper protection of the hard tube and an additional
layer of braided aluminum on the Flex hoses. This
dramatically increased the overall survival rate to
greater than the 0.95 requirement at a cost of a slight
mass increase. While the confidence In application of
the analytical technlques to the complex configurations
of the SDR components was not suFF1clent to recommend
their use For deslgn verification, they did serve to
Identify the areas of the design whlch requlred
modification.
PRELIMINARY TESTING
The unlque geometry of the SDR Flow tubes necessl-
tared a preliminary set of hyperveloclty Impact tests
to assess the applicability of empirical data For sim-
pler geometries. The NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC)
Hyperveloclty Impact Research Laboratory (HIRL) was
selected For thls initlal phase of solar dynamic radia-
tor system tests.
Test Facllit.y
The JSC HIRL contains three two-stage, light-gas
launchers. A single gun was used in this stuay which
has a 4.3 mm launch tube bore and is capable of launch-
Ing 3.2 mm diameter aluminum spheres and 73 mg nylon
slugs at over 7 km/sec. Additional details of the
capabllltles of the HIRL launchers are described In
other reports (Z-9).
The hyperveloclty Impact tests were supported by
a Cordln Model 330 [R hlgh-speed Framing camera. It
operates at I M frames/sec with a 5 ns exposure time
(__0). The camera provides data on projectile velocity
and Integrity, and ejected particle pattern and veloc-
ity. It also serves as an important diagnostic tool to
confirm that a shot is clean; that Just the projectile
and no secondary particles (such as fragments of sabot,
shear plate, or other gun debris) hit the target, or to
provide clues to the problem if the shot Is not c]ean.
Test Procedure
Twelve hypervelocity impact tests were conducted
on target specimens representative of the solar dynamic
orolds are lO and 20 km/sec, respectlvely (11-13). For
simplified hazard assessments using the preliminary
laboratory test results, sca]ing to higher Impact
velocities expected on-orbit can be accomplished by
emplrIcal penetratlon equations For single and dual-
sheet aluminum structures pub]Ished In the literature
(14,15). These empirical models have limited applica-
billty to this partlcular case since the geometry of
the radiator panels Is more complicated than the bases
of the empirical models (given the internal honeycomb
and nonparallel aluminum plates contained within the
radiator panel elements). Therefore, later phases of
the radiator system testing could Involve tests at sev-
eral impact veloclties.
TABLE I. - HYPERVELOCITY IMPACT TEST DATA FOR SOLAR DYNAMIC RADIATOR PANELS
Projectile parameters a
HIRL
shot
number
AB73
AB75
AB76
AB77
A880
AB82
A883
AB84
A885
A891
A892
A897
Material
A12OI7-T4
Diam- Velocity,
eter, kmls
mm
l.O
A12017-T6 1L'59
AI2017-T6 1.59
A12017-T4 1.25
6.9
7.0
6.73
6.85
6.8
5.9
6.90
7.04
6.7
6.94
6.67
6.77
aAll spherical projectiles with density
Impact
angle,
degree
45
0
45
0
45
0
45
.796 g/cc.
radiator panels (Fig. 2). Each test specimen was
approximately 5.1 cm wlde by 6.0 cm long by 1.8 cm
thick and was blsected by a slngle bumpered Flow tube.
Test conditions are given In Table I. The obJectlve
for these preliminary tests was to assess the response
of the radiator panels to hyperveloclty impact as a
function of projectile dlameter and impact angle. In
particular, it was hoped the tests would help determlne
the "balIIstlc llmit" of the Flow tubes within the pan-
els; that Is, the particle size that Just causes fail-
ure (penetratlon) of the flow tubes.
Because orbltal debris Is expected to have the
density of alumlnum In the partlcle size range tested
(11,12), alumlnum projectiles were used In the impact
tests. Aluminum (A12017) spheres with diameters of
1.0 mm, 1.25 mm, and 1.6 mm were launched at impact
angles normal (0°) and at 45 ° to the panel surface. In
all but one of the 45 ° angle impact tests, the proJec-
tlle flight direction was directed perpendicular to the
panel flow tube's longitudinal axis. One 45 ° angle
shot was directed parallel to the flow tube longitudi-
nal axis. These angles were selected to provide data
for normal and oblique impacts, and are not necessarlly
critical angles.
The tests were conducted In a narrow range of
Impact velocities (6 to 7 km/sec). These velocltles
only approach the lower 11mit of the velocities
expected on orblt, but are currently the hlghest veloc-
itles avallable experlmentally In the partlcle range of
interest. Some method Is needed to scale the experi-
mental results to velocities experienced on-orbit.
Average impact velocities For orbital debrls and mete-
Direction
relative
to flow
axis
Normal
Normal
Normal
t
Parallel
Normal
Normal
Mass,
mg
1.46
i
4.
5.86
5.86
2.86
Target damage
MIss
distance
alm line
to middle
flow tube,
[Pall
13.1
7.0
3.2
2.4
8.5
0.5
(n/a)
3.5
5.2
2.4
1.2
9.2
Bumper
interior
damage
comments
Slight dimple
Spall bubb]e
Slight dimple
Perforated
Perforated
Flow
tube
damage
comments
Pinched
Pinched
TEST RESULTS
Figure 4 shows the results of a 1.0 mm alumlnum
sphere Impactlng at a normal angle (0°) at 6.85 km/sec.
Although the projectile missed striking the flow tube
directly, it left a "spall bubble" on the inside of
the flow tube bumperlng (the flow tube was unaffected),
Each shot was aimed at the center of the flow
tube, although some "miss distance" occurred for each
shot due to experimental llmitatlons (e.g., Flg. 4
shows the projectile hole to one slde of the flow tube
axis). The miss distance shown In Table I Is the mini-
mum dlstance from the projectile fllght path to the
middle of the flow tube. Since the nominal o.d. of the
Flow tube is 3.4 mm (0.134 in.), mlss dlstances greater
than 1.7 mm do not intersect the flow tube. Only two
shots (A882 and A892) had original trajectories that
would have impacted the flow tube.
Figure 5 shows the results of a 1.6 mm aluminum
sphere impact at a normal (0°) impact angle. Thls
Impact was nearly centered over the flow tube (1.2 mm
mlss distance on a 1.7 mm radius flow tube). The pro-
Jectile broke up when It Impacted the top of the flow
tube bumper, and the expanding debris cloud from the
Inltlal impact penetrated one slde and deformed the
other slde of the flow tube bumper. Although the
impact left a hole In the slde of the bumper and par-
tially plnched-off the flow tube (restrlctlng flow), It
dld not penetrate Into the flow tube itself. However,
(A) FACESHEET AND HONEYCOMB, (A) FACESHEET AND HONEYCO_IB.
(B) FLOW-TUBE CROSS SECTION.
FIGURE h. - PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION OF JSC HIRL SHOT A87/
f1.0 MM AL 2017-T4 PROJECT[LF, 6.85 KM/SEC, NORMAL IMPACT
ANGLE).
as shown In Fig. 6, a very large hole was opened Into
the flow tube bumper wall for the same size projectile
(1.6 ram)at a 45° Impact, which If better centered on
the flow tube <mlss distance was 2.4 mm), would most
llkely have penetrated Into the flow tube as well.
Wlth these experimental results, a prellmInary
hazai'd assessment can be performed for the radiator
panel flow tubes. The crltIca] particle slze causlng
failure of the second sheet (d) Is Inversely propor-
tlona] to both projectile velocity and the square root
of particle density by the Cour-Palals penetration
function for a dual-wall aluminum structure (lj), I.e.:
d =:V-I 6p0"5 (5)
Glven that a 1.5g mm aluminum particle at 6.9 km/
sec will penetrate a flow tube, it was calculated that
a ].og mm debris particle (with average velocity of
]0 km/sec, density of 2.8 g/co) and a 1.30 mm meteoroid
particle (average velocity of 20 kmlsec, density of
0.5 glcc) wlll also cause failure. (It should be noted
that the calcuIatlon was based on the results of a sln-
gIe data point. Future testing will examlne the pene-
tration limit In more detail.)
There are two Independent flow loops for the solar
dynamic radiator system. Each of eight radiator panels
In the solar dynamic system Is 8.05 m long and contains
l_J
IN.
(B) FLOW-TUBE CROSS-SECTION,
FIGURE 5, - PHOTOGRAPHIC DOCUMENTATION Of- JSC HIRL A892
(1.59 MM AL 2017-T6 PROJECTIIE, 6.67 KM/SEC, NORMAL IMPACT
ANGLE).
18 lengths of prlmary flow tubes (3.4 mm o.d.) In each
cooling loop for a total area of both primary and sec-
ondary loops of 24.78 m2. A preliminary estimate of
the number of Impacts from orbltal debris and meteor-
oids on the radlator panel tubes that are large enough
to cause failure over a lO year period is glven In
Table II. These numbers were calculated using the CUr-
rently basellned space statlon orblta] debris (ll) and
meteoroid (13) envlronments. Table II shows that the
probabllity_f no-fallure of either of the two loops
from orbital debrls and meteorolds Is 0.67 over
10 years (1.e., there Is one chance In three that one
of the two loops will fall In I0 years). Thls was cal-
culated from the Individual probabillty of no-failure
of the prlmary and secondary loops which are both 0.8]6
over lO years (I.e., 0.8162 = 0.67). The chance that
both primary and secondary loops wlll not fail from
meteorolds and debris over I0 years Is 0.966.
Figure 7 Illustrates the high-speed camera f11m
from HIRL shot A891 (oblique 45° impact of a 1.59 mm
aluminum sphere at 6.94 km/sec). A large trash parti-
cle visible In the hlgh-speed film following the pro-
Jectlle In shot ABgl dld not result In much target
damage as Indicated In Flg. 6 (it barely penetrated
the face sheet). The hlgh-speed camera fllm from shot
A877 (normal impact of a l.O mm aluminum sphere at
6.85 km/sec) Is given In Fig. 8. Thls was a clean
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FIGURE 6. - PHOTOGRAPHICDOCUMENTATIONOF JSC HIRL SHOT A891.
(I.59MM AL 2017-T6 PROJECTILE,6.9h KM/SEC, 450 IMPACT
ANGLE).
TABLE II. - METEOROID/DEBRIS IMPACTS ON SOLAR DYNAMIC RADIATOR PANEL TUBESa
[Surface area: 12.39 m2 per loop (24.78 m2 for both loops); life: lO years; Altitude:
critical meteoroid
Radiator case
500 km;
)article size: 0.130 cm; critical debris particle size: 0.109 cm.]
Number of critical impacts
over life
Single loop
Either loop
(without redundancy)
Both loops
(with redundancy)
Surface
area,
m2
12.39
24.78
24.78
Crltical particle
flux,
impactslm2-year
Meteoroid Debris
7.27E-4 9.14E-4
Meteoroid
0.09
.18
Debris Combined
0.113 0.203
.227 .407
Probability
of
no-failure
0.816
.666
aBased on current debris model in Ref. 11 and meteoroid model in Ref. 13.
.034 .966
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FIGURE 7. - HIGH SPEED CAMERA FILMOF JSC HIRL SHOT A891 (I.59MMAL 201Z-T6 SPHERE, 6.94 KM/SEC, 450 IMPACT ANGtE).
(I MICRO-SECOND BETWEEN FRAMES).
FIGURE 8. - HIGH-SPEED CAMERA FILM OF JSC HIRL SHOT A877 (1.0 MM AL 2017-Th SPHERE, 6.85 KM/SkC, NORMAL 0 ° IMPACT).
(I MICRO SECOND BETWEEN FRAMES).
shot as shown in the film and by the target record
(Fig. 4).
Two addltlonal (and unexpected) observations were
made during post-test analyses. Firstly, the aluminum
honeycomb appears to provide indirect protection for
the flow tube, In a number of test cases, the honey-
comb channelled the particle through the panel. This
would tend to reduce the number of oblique impacts that
would reach the flow tube after passing through the
honeycomb. Secondly, the foam adhesive which binds the
honeycomb to the flow tube extrusion also had a similar
beneflclal effect in providing additional protection
from oblique impacts.
FUTURE TESTING AND ANALYSES
As previously discussed, the equatlons for pene-
tratlon analysis were based on results from tests of
simple configurations and may not be applicable to more
complex geometries such as those of the panel flow
tubes and flex hose. As a result, hypervelocity impact
testing of these two components are planned at the JSC
HIRL faclIity to determine the slze of particle which
can be expected to not produce penetration in low
earth orbit and thereby the probability of survival.
The preliminary set of tests (described herein)
on the panel flow tubes indicated the Flow tube is
extremely difficult to hit due to the small target
size (i.e,, 3.4 mm o.d,), As a result, samples were
designed which would increase target size but maintain
a realistic penetration path. The samples designed for
these tests are shown in Fig. 9. Samo!e A provides a
large target for impacts of the flew Dassage from the
side, in order to test the bumper _all effectiveness.
Two wall thicknesses will be tested on :his sample
design. Sample B is designed to increase the target
area for impacts directly above the f_ow passage (and
normal to the facesheet) since this was the most diffl-
cult angle in preliminary testing. Sample C !s a seg-
ment of the actual panel design. The test plan is to
conduct most of the testing cn the easier to hit sam-
ples A and B and then to utilize those results to
define flna] penetration limit tests aga!nst the actual
panel design.
These results can be analyzed to determine the
panel flow passage vulnerability through adjustments
for particle density and velocity to account for the
differences in test conditions and the low-earth-orbit
micrometeorold and debrls environment. Testing will be
conducted at several approach angles since the penetra-
tion path differs for different angles. Testing also
wlll be performed using projectiles with a density
nearer to typical mlcrometeoroid density (0.5 gm/cc)
as well as with aluminum projectiles.
These tests are planned For the early 1990 time
perlod. Simllar testing of the braided portion of the
flex hose are planned for the 1992 time perlod. The
results of these tests will be used in a more rigorous
calculation of system reliability. Based on the
results of these tests and analyses the design will be
modified as required to meet the overall Qrotection
requirements.
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FIGURE 9, - DESIGN OF HYPERVELOCITYTEST SAMPLES TO
MAXIMIZE USEFUL TEST RESULTS.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
I. A series of 12 hypervelocity impact tests have
been performed on representative solar dynamic radiator
panel elements. The tests were performed with aluminum
spheres having diameters of l.O to 1.6 mm, velocities
of 6 to 7 km/sec, and impact angles up to 45 °, The
tests showed that the radiator panel tubes would be
penetrated by 1.6 mm diameter particles impacting at
laboratory velocities (-7 km/sec).
2. Using current Space Station environment n_Jdels
(11-13), the panel tubes In the baseline solar dynamic
radiator system have a 0.966 reliability (with redun-
dancy) from Failure by meteorold and debris impacts
over I0 years. However, if the radiator system Is
replaced after a slngle loop failure, the calculated
radiator probability of no-replacement due to impact
failure drops to 0.67 over 10 years.
3. The radiator system is made up of more than
Just the panel tubes. The rellabillty of the radiator
panel Interconnect lines and other subsystems exposed
to the meteorold/debrls environment w111 be determined
by hypervelocity impact testing and/or analysis, and
the results Included In an assessment of the overall
radiator system rellability.
4. It should be noted that an updated orbital
debrls environment has been developed from the latest
ground-based measurements and returned spacecraft mate-
rials (12). Thls updated environment Is much more
severe t-han the current debcls environment (ll). These
conclusions should be updated when the new debris envi-
ronment (12) Is baselIned for Freedom's use.
5. The design of the SD heat rejection system will
be modified as necessary to meet the overall protectlon
requirements.
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